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THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEADERSHIP AND MOTIVATION
IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY

JOHN BLWOOD LEE

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEADERSHIP AND MOTIVATION
IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
AND
THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDY
OF
LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE
OF
MASTER OF ARTS

By
John Elwood Lee
Commander, U. S. Navy
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

At no time in the history of the United States Navy has greater recognition been given to the need for effective personnel administration than at the present. For many years the Navy has sponsored research programs for the development of superior weapons. It has also sponsored the training of specialists in those technical fields which produce its equipment. This sponsorship ultimately contributed to the construction of the most powerful naval force of all time. To-day, the Navy is seeking to parallel in the field of human relations the same degree of excellence that it has attained in electronics, in ordnance, and in naval aviation.

A phase of the program for the advancement of personnel administration has been the selection of experienced officers for graduate study in leading universities. Officers up to and including the rank of Captain, with broad combatant and administrative experience, have been enrolled in personnel courses at Stanford, Ohio State and Northwestern. These officers have been directed to examine the progress that has been made in both educational and industrial institutions toward the improvement of human relations and indi-

vidual and group performance. It is expected that as a result of their studies these officers will be qualified to make substantial contributions to the establishment and maintenance of scientifically developed personnel policies and procedures throughout the naval service.

It is the aim of this study to examine the more prevalent theories as to what leadership consists of and to derive those principles which appear to be of special significance to the naval officer in his relations with enlisted men. Since leadership seems to be so closely tied in with the attributes of the leader, a portion of this study will deal with personality traits. The subject of motivation has been included because an adequate knowledge of the needs and drives which influence human behavior is essential for a thorough understanding of the techniques in the application of the principles of leadership.

There is a need for emphasis on the study of leadership and motivation in the training of junior officers, officer candidates, and petty officers. The fundamental training of our young officers is at present largely in the more technical areas of their profession. Yet, although the modern naval officer or petty officer may have many duties which require a high degree of technical training and skill, his ultimate success or failure depends upon the results he obtains as a leader of men.

The sources of material for this study include of-

ficial documents, both published and unpublished, and the published findings and opinions of authorities on the subjects which are discussed. Augmenting these sources are the criticisms and suggestions of various naval officers and enlisted men, plus the writer's eighteen years of experience as a naval officer with three submarine commands during World War II.

It is hoped that this study will be of value to those who are interested in understanding some of the problems and responsibilities of a naval officer and that it may contribute toward maintaining the high standards of performance which have long been characteristic of the U. S. Navy.

CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM

A young naval officer must deal with many human problems that are to him complex and confusing. From one assignment to the next he may need to exercise his ingenuity to the utmost in order to satisfy the demands of his superiors and to obtain the co-operation of his subordinates. Although his supervisory responsibilities may be quite limited in scope, his performance as a leader will be of considerable importance to him because it shapes the foundation of his service reputation. Years of conscientious struggle may be required to overcome the damage to a junior officer's reputation that results from an early ineptness in human relations. During the closing months of World War II, a Navy Department study found that the junior officer who was "least wanted" on board his ship was so designated because he was poor at handling enlisted men, more often than for any other single reason.¹

In dealing with his human problems, the young officer is frequently handicapped by an inadequate understand-

¹Bureau of Naval Personnel Research Report. Project No. 439, Study of the Performance of Junior Officers Aboard Ship, Unpublished: 1945.

ing of the principles of leadership and motivation that are most applicable in the analysis and control of the situations which confront him. The guidance that a junior officer receives from his seniors is often contradictory or so generalized as to be of little real value. One precept that has been given to junior officers in the past tells them that "A taut ship is a happy ship." There is, however, little agreement among Navy men as to what constitutes a taut ship and there is insufficient evidence to support the implied conclusion that a happy ship is the most valid criterion of effective leadership. The junior officer who does not receive reliable guidance must generally develop his abilities as a leader through trial and error methods.

It is not intended to imply that leadership is something that is readily attained, nor is it easy to describe. The young officer cannot turn to a manual or handbook for the correct solutions of his personnel problems with the same confidence that he can consult the Manual of Engineering Instructions when he needs to learn the correct procedure to be used in "lighting off" a boiler. There are no hard and fast rules which will guarantee success in human relations. Each situation needs to be handled individually and when different men are involved in identical situations, totally different solutions are often necessary.

In the absence of standard methods and procedures for the handling of human problems, the young officer needs

to study, observe, experiment, and decide for himself which course of action seems best fitted to each situation with which he must deal. Eventually, he may strike upon a series of principles which he will adopt as his general guides in dealing with his subordinates. In selecting these principles, it is to be hoped that he will not disregard the knowledge that has been made available through scientific studies of human behavior and that he will give careful consideration to the needs and desires of the men with whom he serves.

The problem dealt with in this study is that of developing principles and practices of personnel motivation and leadership which must be observed by the junior officer if he is to make a success of his naval career.

It is not proposed to offer new solutions or techniques, but rather through a study of the relevant material in the fields of leadership and motivation, to provide a synthesis of the findings of social and psychological investigations which may cast some additional light on the leadership problems of the junior officer.

Naval leadership is concerned, on the junior officer level, with those leader-follower relationships that are direct and personal. It requires a knowledge of the background and interests of the men who are to be led as well as a clear comprehension of the objectives to be attained by the group. It involves the behavior of men in a situation where the leader has been assigned to a position of authority

and responsibility because of his previous training and potential ability. The problem of leadership on this level is often complicated by the age factor; it is to be expected that some enlisted personnel may be older in both years and experience than the young officer. In such circumstances, tact and understanding on the part of the officer are required.

The young officer may initially possess only that symbolic prestige which is his by virtue of his superior rank in the organization. He must recognize that if he is to develop into a competent leader, he will need to reinforce or replace this symbolic prestige with actual personal prestige in the eyes of those whom he must lead; that it is necessary to demonstrate to his men that he is in fact a leader--their leader.

In this study, motivation is considered as the employment of cues or intentional stimuli for the purpose of energizing drives towards certain desired types of behavior. In this sense, motivation may be regarded as an instrument of leadership which can be used by the officer who will make the effort to learn the wants, interests, attitudes and emotions of his men. The leader should learn how to use these drives most effectively as fulcrums for the alignment of individual and group behavior with the objectives of leadership.

Insofar as is practicable, this dissertation will be

limited to the basic aspects of motivation and leadership which are particularly applicable in the daily tasks of the naval officer. Therefore, no attempt will be made to analyze or explain these highly inspirational acts which occur in times of great emergency. The history and traditions of the United States Navy have established a pattern of behavior in extremely critical situations which provides material for a study in itself and requires no amplification here.

An examination of the literature indicates that prior to World War II much that was written about military leadership and motivation was heavily loaded with platitudes and generalized rules of thumb for dealing with enlisted men. These writings probably helped some officers to avoid the more common errors made by inexperienced leaders. But, probably because the writers lacked a comprehensive background of psychology, they failed to make substantial contributions to a better understanding of the fundamental scientific principles involved in military leadership.

With the onset of the war, a number of capable educators, psychologists, and sociologists were integrated in the armed forces and were employed in positions which afforded them opportunities to observe both objectively and subjectively, the inter-play of the leader and his followers in the military situation. This situation led to more scientific inquiries in the field of military and naval leadership

than had hitherto been envisioned. During this period the first Research Unit was established in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Originally this unit functioned as a part of the Training Division, but later developed into a major division of the Bureau and eventually encompassed personnel problems in many areas in addition to training.

In 1943 the National Research Council produced the first complete work in which the whole body of psychological knowledge was applied to the needs of the armed services. The members of this council, of which Edwin G. Boring was the chairman, included such well known authorities as Gordon W. Allport, Walter V. Dillman, Marjorie Van de Water and others. This first work² was followed in 1945 by a more nearly complete textbook which was published under the title of "Psychology for the Armed Services."³ Other studies, which were undertaken both in the line of duty and as purely individual projects, have been reported in the various official publications and professional journals.

Research did not cease with the termination of hostilities. The Office of Naval Research has awarded contracts to a number of leading educational institutions for the investigation of problems in many areas that are closely re-

²National Research Council, Psychology for the Fighting Man (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1943).

³Edwin G. Boring, Ed., Psychology for the Armed Services (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1945).

lated to the leadership functions of the naval officer. A few typical examples of these investigations are indicated below:

1. A Study of Leadership in Naval Establishments.
Contractor: Ohio State University.
Investigator: C. Shartle.
2. Research on Fundamental Problems of Organizing Human Behavior.
Contractor: University of Michigan.
Investigator: R. Likert.
3. Experimental Studies on Group Productivity and Communication Within Groups.
Contractor: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Investigators: D. Cartwright and R. Lippitt.
4. Basic Studies of Leadership.
Contractor: University of Rochester.
Investigator: L. Carter.
5. Field Evaluation of Materials on Leadership.
Contractor: University of Maryland.
Investigator: J. G. Jenkins.

One interesting observation on leaders and leadership which is contained in a preliminary report on the Ohio State project is as follows:

It is not especially difficult to find persons who are leaders. It is quite another matter to place these persons in different situations where they will be able to function as leaders. It becomes clear that an adequate analysis of leadership involves not only a study of leaders, but also of situations.

The evidence suggests that leadership is a relation that exists between persons in a social situation, and that persons who are leaders in one situation may not necessarily be leaders in other situations.⁴

In the chapters that follow, the situation in which the junior officer is expected to function as a leader has

⁴Ralph M. Stogdill, "Personal Factors Associated With Leadership: A Survey of the Literature," The Journal of Psychology, 25 (January, 1948), p. 65.

been taken into consideration in determining the principles of motivation and leadership that will be examined.

CHAPTER III

LEADERSHIP

What is leadership? Is it an art, a science, or a gift? Can it be learned or acquired by all people? What are the characteristics which distinguish a leader from a follower? Does naval or military leadership differ markedly from other forms of leadership? What technique does the successful leader use to get results?

Definitions

At the United States Naval Academy, midshipmen are taught that leadership is "the art of imposing one's will upon others in such a manner as to command their obedience, their confidence, their respect, and their loyal co-operation."¹ Here we have an inspirational definition of leadership which has unquestionably been carefully selected for use in the training of embryonic officers. This definition sets up standards of achievement which may not always be attained but which are highly desirable goals in the practice of naval leadership.

A widely circulated Navy handbook states that "Lead-

¹Modern Naval Leadership, Executive Department, U. S. Naval Academy, June, 1947, (mimeographed), p. 7.

ership is that quality, inherent or acquired in a person which enables him to achieve accomplishment from his subordinates by virtue of their willingness rather than by force."² In this definition leadership is presented in terms of the acceptance of the leader by the followers.

Social psychologists have provided us with a definition of leadership in terms of behavior, which, upon first reading, seems to be simple and uncomplicated. LePiere and Farnsworth³ conceive it to be "behavior which affects the behavior of other people more than their behavior affects that of the leader." From this definition we may infer that when leadership has specific objectives, the behavior of the leader must be such as will produce the desired results. All leadership in the Navy is expected to have well defined goals, some of which are general, while others are quite specific.

Many men in industrial and military organizations think of leadership simply as the handling of men. Such thinking needs to be revised if leadership is considered to be behavior. The leader does not actually handle men, it is himself that he handles.

The concept of leadership as a kind of behavior

²Naval Leadership with Some Hints to Junior Officers and Others, (Annapolis: The United States Naval Institute, 1939), p. 1.

³Richard T. LePiere and Paul R. Farnsworth, Social Psychology (New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1942), p. 178.

seems to be more realistic and more workable than to describe it as an art. Psychology shows us that while some degree of behavior may be inherent, much of it can be acquired through the process of learning. Leadership can be developed to some degree in all persons who are capable of learning. Mastery of an art is attainable by relatively few.

Nominal Leadership

Leadership is exercised in varying degrees, depending upon the situation in which it exists. Some situations result in merely nominal leadership, such as is exercised by a lecturer in respect to his audience. Each member of the audience may experience a different reaction to what the lecturer says and does. He may cause some members to revise their attitudes or beliefs. In others, he may merely cause boredom or induce sleep.

The traffic policeman at a busy intersection may, to some extent, impose his will upon, or affect the behavior of others in a more positive and direct manner than will the lecturer. Both the policeman and the lecturer are exercising nominal leadership, although it is not generally recognized as such.

Nominal leadership is also exercised by the writer of a technical paper if he influences his readers to the extent that they think or act in ways that are even slightly different from the way they would think or act if they had not read his paper. Thus, it can be seen that nominal lead-

ership is possible even at great distances. In the Navy, nominal leadership is exercised to a considerable extent by staff and Bureau organizations. Nominal leadership is not often practiced by the junior officer and for this reason it will not be considered further in this study.

Direct Leadership

In the man-to-men situation in which the junior officer functions on board ship, he is called upon to exercise actual, direct, personal leadership. Here is where the officer's behavior affects the behavior of his men, and, although he may be unaware of it, their behavior will have some effect on him. Here is where he is expected to command obedience and respect, to inspire confidence and co-operation. In order to determine what forms his behavior should take to accomplish these effects we need to further examine leadership in its relation to situations.

Leadership and Social Situations

Any discussion of leadership would be meaningless without reference to the social situation in which it arises. Lewin⁴ has provided us with a useful concept for understanding leadership in relation to the social situation.

The three conditions of autocracy, democracy, and laissez-faire are perceived as having a triangular relation-

⁴Kurt Lewin, "The Dynamics of Group Action," Educational Leadership, 1:195-200, January, 1944.




Fig. 1.--Relations between Autocracy, Democracy, and Laissez-Faire.

ship, each having control and responsibility differently placed. As the social situation changes from democratic to autocratic, the freedom of the individual is reduced and the authority of the leader increases. Between either democracy or autocracy and laissez-faire, the freedom of the individual approaches a maximum and leadership becomes increasingly less effective. In this triangle, both autocracy and democracy mean leadership, discipline, and organization as opposed to the chaos of laissez-faire.

Autocratic Leadership

Autocratic leadership rules men without consulting them. It may be extremely harsh or comparatively mild. Of the autocratic leader, Bogardus says:

(He) is objective, overt, positive. He knows what ought to be done, what he wants to do, and he drives ahead to that end. He proceeds aggressively and obtrusively. He commands and organizes. He captivates and paralyzes. On occasion he moves with precision; again, he blusters and storms. He exercises great freedom, acting as a law unto himself. He risks his life. He is

proud, boastful, cock-sure--or seemingly so. If he doubts, he never discloses his doubts.⁵

Group decision and group responsibility are minimized under autocratic leadership. The objectives of the leader take precedence over the wishes of the individuals. This condition causes frustrations within the group which frequently lead to aggressive action towards other groups.

In an experiment conducted to observe the effects of autocratic, democratic, and laissez-faire leadership in boys' clubs, Lippitt and White⁶ found that those whose home training had been strict had the least difficulty in making adjustment to autocratic leadership. In Nazi Germany, Hitler made good use of the early training of German youth to instill in them acceptance of the autocratic leadership of the State. By encouraging persecution of the Jews, Hitler provided an outlet for the frustration which his leadership produced.

When leadership in the boys' clubs changed from autocratic to a freer social atmosphere, there were observed great outbursts of horse play between members during the first few days in either the democratic or the laissez-faire situation.

⁵Henry S. Bogardus, Leaders and Leadership (New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1934), p. 20.

⁶Ronald Lippitt and Ralph K. White, "An Experimental Study of Leadership and Group Life," Readings in Social Psychology, ed. by Theodore M. Newcomb and others (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1947), p. 315.

Democratic Leadership

In the completely democratic situation, the authority of the leader is given to him by common agreement of the group. The leader does not dominate; rather, it is the group will that dominates. In this situation, leadership develops out of the common needs of the group. It attempts to satisfy these needs by stimulating that group behavior which will result in achieving the desired objectives.

Even though the leader may not have been elected by the group, it is still possible for him to rule in a democratic manner. He can learn the needs of the group and exercise his leadership so as to satisfy many of them. He may encourage suggestions as to how to solve group problems. Frequently, the group may suggest solutions which have already been decided upon by the leader. These suggestions are valuable because they are more readily accepted when they come from the group than when they are imposed by authority. A democratically led group may become highly disciplined and efficient.

The part that followers take in leadership is indicated by Lewin as follows:

Autocratic as well as democratic leadership consists in playing certain roles. These roles of the leader cannot be carried through without the followers playing certain complementary roles, namely, those of an autocratic or of a democratic follower.⁷

⁷Lewin, op. cit., p. 199.

Naval Leadership

Nothing can be gained by trying to prove that leadership in the Navy is democratic or that it is wholly autocratic. The responsibilities of the Navy for the defense of the Nation are well recognized and accepted. Likewise, the duties of Navy officers and petty officers which must be performed in carrying out the over-all responsibility of the Navy are well defined. The necessity for the leaders to perform their assigned duties is no more open to question than is the necessity for the Navy to act in defense of the country.

Some of the tasks required of naval officers can be accomplished more effectively through autocratic leadership, some through democratic leadership. The captain of a submarine does not consult his subordinates to learn which ship in an enemy convoy they want to attack, or whether they wish to attack at all. The same captain will consult with and consider the suggestions of his heads of departments when planning the work that will be done in an overhaul period. These heads of departments will probably have already consulted with their men to determine the work that is required in each department.

In carrying out his responsibilities, the naval officer often finds it possible to elect either democratic or autocratic leadership. In such cases, the choice he makes is probably of less consequence than the manner in which his

leadership is exercised. Autocratic leadership can be fully as considerate and friendly as can democratic leadership.

Different situations and functions clearly require different techniques of leadership. During the recent war, some officers who had been rated as average or below in performing their peacetime duties proved to be outstanding in combat conditions. Bogardus comments as follows:

One type of ability may spell leadership in a given situation and defeat in another of a different character. It is the "particular situation" which doubtless is as important as mental ability and capacity in the development of leadership.⁸

Attributes of Leaders

Several studies have been made for the purpose of determining the personal characteristics that distinguish leaders from followers. Since there probably have been outstanding personalities in nearly all groups, it would seem likely that it might be possible to discover a pattern of personal traits which are typically indicative of leadership. Such factors as heredity, weight, height, intelligence, scholarship, and extroversion-introversion have been investigated in the search for common characteristics in leaders.

Years ago it was thought that heredity was the major factor in the determination of leadership, that "like produces like." Vestiges of this concept remain to-day in the transfer of royal titles in many countries. There is some

⁸Bogardus, op. cit., p. 269.

evidence which indicates that a slightly larger percentage of superior offspring arise from distinguished parents than from the mass of mediocre parents. Studies of intelligence in relation to heredity have shown that children of superior parents will tend to be above the average of the population, but not as far above the average as are their parents; on the other hand, children of below average parents will tend to be below the average of the population, but not as far below as their parents. Thus, the offspring of both superior and inferior parents will tend to regress toward the mean of the population.

Statistics have been accumulated on the physical characteristics of leaders in colleges, of outstanding business executives, of top men in government positions, and of famous leaders of past generations. These data indicate that, in general, the physical characteristics of the leaders do not differ in any significant way from the average of their groups. A few leaders have possessed great physical strength but there have been others who were small and weak.

A summary of the findings that have been obtained in studies to determine the personal characteristics of leaders is given by Stogdill as follows:

The average person who occupies a position of leadership exceeds the average member of his group in the following respects: (1) intelligence, (2) scholarship, (3) dependability in exercising responsibilities, (4) activity and social participation, and (5) socio-economic status.

The qualities, characteristics and skills required

in a leader are determined to a large extent by the demands of the situation in which he is to function as a leader.⁹

With regard to intelligence, it might be well to note that the leaders are usually only slightly above the average and that an individual who is markedly superior in intelligence to the others in the group is seldom accepted as their leader.

Traits Expected in Leaders

In addition to attempting to learn what characteristics leaders actually have, investigations have been conducted in an effort to discover what factors people consider to be important in their leaders. A list of ten traits which seem to be "ideally desirable" is provided by Ordway Tead; these are: (1) Physical and nervous energy, (2) A sense of purpose and direction, (3) Enthusiasm, (4) Friendliness and affection, (5) Integrity, (6) Technical mastery, (7) Decisiveness, (8) Intelligence, (9) Teaching skill, (10) Faith.¹⁰

Not many men can be found who possess all of these ideal traits. All men have their weaknesses and their strengths and there are certainly some successful leaders who do not have more than five or six of these ideally desirable characteristics. However, since most of these traits

⁹Stogdill, op. cit., p. 63.

¹⁰Ordway Tead, The Art of Leadership (New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1935), p. 83.

seen possible to acquire with some effort, the man who wants to become a leader can consciously do much toward developing them within himself.

In this discussion of the personality characteristics of a leader we must not lose sight of the important part that the situation has in determining leadership. Regardless of the admirable personal qualities that an individual may possess, he must always fit in with the needs of the situation for leadership to exist.

Skill Required in Naval Leadership

In addition to desirable personal characteristics, the naval officer must develop certain skills if he is to enact effectively the role of a leader in the situations with which he must deal.

Skill in organizing is of particular importance in naval leadership. Perhaps the first organization that existed was a military organization. Essentially, organization is a form of discipline, which if properly accomplished, can contribute immensely to successful leadership.

Organization is not a mere abstraction; on the contrary, it can and should be dynamic. The principles of organization do not change, but organizations must continually change to meet the requirements of a particular situation. The primary objective of organization should be to facilitate co-ordination so as to best achieve the purposes of the group.

The type of organization which is most often used by the junior officer is the straight line organization in which authority and responsibility are fixed in a direct chain of command. He should also be familiar with the line and staff organization as it exists in the Navy and the functional type of organization which may be used to advantage for special types of work.

The ideal of sound organization according to Spriegel is "to fix responsibility as low in the organization as competence exists to assume the responsibility."¹¹ Some officers are reluctant to delegate authority because they fear that the authority and responsibility are more than the subordinate can handle. Much can be done to overcome this feeling of insecurity on the part of the leader if he will give more attention to the training of his subordinates to increase their capabilities for accepting authority and responsibility.

Not only do leaders sometimes fail to delegate authority, but, as Bogardus points out in the following paragraph, they may even fail to properly delegate the work that needs to be done.

One difficulty is that so few leaders are able to properly delegate work to others. A leader often does much more than he needs to and hence handicaps himself. Many take themselves too seriously and feel that no one else can do as well as they. This tendency is an introvertive failing. To take one's work or self too seri-

¹¹William R. Spriegel, Principles of Business Organization (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946), p. 43.

ously undoes a leader. A distinguished university professor insisted on meeting his classes when he was ill, because his students "would miss him so much." He was unaware that even when he was present, some of the boys on the rear rows of seats in his large class often spent a part of the class hour in playing cards!¹²

Skill in organization involves more than the preparation of an attractive organization chart. It requires a clear definition of duties, a fixing of responsibility and authority and an allocation of tasks in a manner that will best achieve the objectives of the group.

Skill in the Communication of Ideas

Leadership in an organization requires skill in the communication of ideas. The leader needs to have some ability as a teacher. In the Navy, there are many instances where teaching and the communication of ideas can take the place of a large amount of order giving.

The officer can obtain better co-operation from his men and develop more favorable attitudes if he not only tells them what is to be done, but also states good reasons as to why it should be done. Knowing why something is required or directed makes the task more interesting and less difficult; and as a consequence, it contributes to the effectiveness of its execution.

The channels of communication that are used should be definitely known. In general, the lines of communication

¹²Bogardus, op. cit., p. 264.

and the lines of authority are the same. The regular channel of communication, when once established, should usually be used completely. To by-pass any step in the line of communication may lead to misinterpretation and conflicting ideas.

Skill in Planning and Directing

The phase of a young officer's leadership which most often comes under the critical observation of his superiors is the skill with which he plans and directs the work of his subordinates. The multitude of tasks which must be accomplished as a matter of daily routine on board ship provides excellent training opportunities for acquiring skill in planning and directing.

For effective co-ordination of the efforts of his subordinates, the leader needs to consider the things that must be done, the order in which they can best be accomplished, and the members of the group who should be assigned to each task. Planning involves both the delegation of authority and sound decision making.

The making of decisions, as everyone knows from personal experience, is a burdensome task. Offsetting the exhilaration that may result from correct and successful decision and the relief that follows the terminating of a struggle to determine issues is the depression that comes from failure or error of decision and the frustration which ensues from uncertainty. Accordingly, it will be observed that men generally try to avoid making decisions, beyond a limited degree when they are rather uncritical responses to conditions. The capacity of most men to make decisions is quite narrow, although

it is a capacity that may be considerably developed by training and especially by experience.¹³

Knowledge Required for Naval Leadership

Sound decision making requires seasoned judgment.

It also requires considerable knowledge of the work to be done and of the capabilities of the men who are to do it.

The general line officer in the Navy is expected to be qualified to fill a wide variety of technical and administrative positions. At the junior officer level, there is little specialization, and even in the higher ranks, specialization exists to a lesser degree than in other professions. In order to acquire the technical knowledge he needs, a naval officer must devote a large amount of his time to study.

The Navy's system of education for officers includes a Post-Graduate School, a War College, two General Line Schools, and various Gunnery Schools, Radar Schools, and other special courses. In addition, correspondence courses in many professional subjects are also available to officers throughout the Navy.

Of equal or greater importance than the knowledge of technical matters is a knowledge of human characteristics and behavior. For success in his work, the officer must develop considerable ability in selecting and placing men in the jobs for which they are best equipped, psychologically

¹³Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946), p. 189.

as well as technically. As a general rule, the officer works with the same group of men for a relatively brief period of time as compared with leaders in industry. Short term enlistments and the Navy's policy of rotation of duty assignments combine to produce an extremely high rate of personnel turnover in many instances. It is not unusual to experience an annual turn-over rate in a ship's crew that is well in excess of one hundred per cent.

These conditions make it imperative for officers to develop systematic procedures which will enable them to obtain a knowledge and understanding of the men with whom they serve. The Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Rear Admiral T. L. Sprague, in a letter addressed to young officers in the Navy, has posed some questions that call for considerable thought and effort on the part of each officer. In part, he states:

You must know your men. Stop for a moment and ask yourself if you really know your men. Perhaps you are a Division Officer. What do you know about those men who stand before you at morning muster? Which of them are married? How many children have they? Which of them have personal worries--sickness at home, money trouble? What part of the country do they come from? Do you know the early environment of each of them? Have you some idea of their hopes, ambitions; their thoughts for the future? You should, if you are to make the most of their capabilities and help them to correct a fault or weakness that was overlooked in their youth. This doesn't mean that you should pry into a man's personal life; only that you should let him know that you are interested in him as a person. Do they bring their troubles to you in the knowledge that they will receive a sympathetic hearing, sound advice, intelligent guidance? If they do, you will go far in your profession. If they don't you should take time off for introspection.

Study yourself. Analyze your strengths and weaknesses, your personality traits. Become a leader.¹⁴

Much of the factual information that an officer needs to have concerning his men can be obtained from their service records. Such information as age, marital status, number of dependents, test scores, civilian education, and work experience is tabulated in the first pages of each man's personnel jacket. The extent to which an officer can profitably use these data varies with his own experience and the item of information with which he is dealing.

Some special training is required for an intelligent understanding of the significance of the test scores that are listed. Early in his recruit training, each enlisted man is given a series of psychological tests. These may include a mechanical aptitude test, a numerical reasoning test, a clerical aptitude test, and a general classification test. The latter is essentially a paper and pencil type of intelligence test.

The officer should know something of the nature of the tests that are used and the relationships which have been found to hold between the scores on these tests and the probabilities of subsequent achievement. He needs, of course, much more than test scores, for, as Bingham reminds us,

Aptitudes indicate potentialities. Aptitude tests

¹⁴Rear Admiral T. L. Sprague, "Your Men and You--An open letter to the Young Officers of the Navy," from the Chief of Naval Personnel, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 73: p. 1237. October, 1947.

measure abilities and interests. They ascertain what an individual actually does in certain standardized situations, and from these measurements the estimate of capacity for future accomplishment is an inference--a statistical probability, not a certainty. Moreover, tests cannot sample all the important aspects of behavior, nor plumb the depths of vocational purpose. Even with full data at hand, an inquirer's questions regarding his aptitudes can rarely be answered precisely and with positive assurance.¹⁵

For an officer to know his men well enough to give them intelligent guidance and sound advice he must develop a type of human relationship that is not easily accomplished. In the first place, there is the difficulty of getting his men to feel free to discuss their problems with him. There is an understandable reluctance on the part of enlisted men to approach an officer on matters of other than official business.

Perhaps the best step an officer can take towards improving his knowledge of his men is to arrange an informal interview with each man in his unit and with each new man that joins the organization. Even though they are informal, these interviews should be carefully planned and structured. The officer should review all the available information he can get on each man before the interview. It is important that he maintain a friendly attitude throughout the interview and, insofar as is possible, he should avoid any display of authority. An all too common error in interviewing is to overtalk the interviewee. The objective should be to

¹⁵Walter Van Dyke Bingham, Aptitudes and Aptitude Testing (New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1937), p. 11.

obtain, rather than to give information. Questions should be limited to those that will help the client to stick to the subject, and questions that can be answered by a simple "Yes" or "No" should be avoided.

One of the most interesting interviewing programs that has ever been recorded is that which was conducted at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company. In this program, the rules which the interviewers devised to improve their interviewing techniques were found to be translatable into simple rules for the supervisor in handling his relations with his men. Roethlisberger has provided an excellent presentation of these rules in the following summary:

These rules apply to the first-line supervisor, as well as to the higher executive, in his relations to individuals with whom he has face-to-face contacts.

The first rule is that the supervisor should listen patiently to what his subordinate has to say before making any comment himself. Probably the quickest way to stop a person from sufficiently expressing himself is to interrupt. Of course, it follows that, besides listening and not interrupting, the supervisor should try to understand what his subordinate is saying. Moreover, he should show his interest in what is being said.

The second rule is that the supervisor should refrain from hasty disapprobation of his subordinate's conduct. It is not his business, in the first instance at least, to give advice or moral admonition. If the employee says, "This is a hell of a company to work for," the attitude of the supervisor should not be, "Tut, tut, my good man, you are not displaying the proper spirit." Instead, he should try to get the employee to express himself more fully by asking why he feels as he does. In many instances employees by themselves are not able to state precisely the particular source of their dissatisfaction, but if they are encouraged to talk freely the effect is not merely emotional relief but also the revelation to the critical listener (and sometimes even to the speaker himself) of the locus of the complaint.

The third rule is that the supervisor should not

argue with his subordinate. It is futile to try to change sentiments by logic. The best way for the supervisor to avoid arguments is to see that the employee's sentiments do not act on his own. It will be remembered that when Bill told his employer that his piece rates were too low he acted upon his employer's own sentiments. The employer felt that he had to defend his wage rates.

The fourth rule is that the supervisor should not pay exclusive attention to the manifest content of the conversation. The interviewers had discovered that there is a tendency to rationalize sentiments and that in ordinary social intercourse the participants are likely to become more interested in the truth of the rationalizations than in the sentiments that are being expressed.

...
The fifth rule is that the supervisor should listen not only to what a person wants to say but also to what he does not want to say or cannot say without assistance. A person has difficulty in talking about matters which are associated with unpleasant and painful experiences, and many sentiments tend to remain so much in the background of a person's thinking that he is unaware of them. It is important to listen for what a person regards as so obvious and so common that it never occurs to him to doubt or question it. These implicit assumptions are of the greatest importance in assessing a person's values and significances. How often one discerns when listening to people the following assumptions: that everything that is not perfectly safe is dangerous (the common assumption of the hypochondriac); that everything that is not perfectly clean is dirty (the fussy housekeeper); that everything that is not perfectly good is bad (the Puritan); that everything that is not perfectly efficient is inefficient (some efficiency engineers). These are all false distinctions and oversimplifications.¹⁶

Some illuminating information might be obtained when these rules are observed by an officer who seeks to learn the facts behind the complaints of his men. An inspecting officer on a Navy ship once asked a seaman what he thought of the food that was served. The seaman hesitantly replied, "It's very good sir, what there is of it." When the officer

¹⁶ F. J. Roethlisberger, Management and Morale (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1944), pp. 41-43.

asked, "Don't they give you enough to eat?", the seaman quickly responded, "Oh yes sir, there's plenty to eat, such as it is." Further inquiry might have disclosed the fact that the seaman had intensely disliked his tour of duty as a mess man and particularly the work he was required to perform at the direction of the ship's cooks.

One of the fundamental prerequisites of leadership, and, perhaps the most important, is a thoroughly sound knowledge of the persons who are to be led. The junior officer who is anxious to become a successful leader can best aid the development of this human relationship by listening to his men and learning all he can about their backgrounds, their attitudes, and their aspirations.

Summary

Leadership is behavior which affects the behavior of others and which the leader employs to shape the actions and attitudes of his followers in conformance with his own. It can be developed to some extent in most people. It is exercised in varying degrees from purely nominal leadership to actual and direct leadership.

All leadership must be considered in relation to the social situation in which it exists. In a completely laissez-faire situation leadership is non-existent. Leadership in a democratic situation may be considered as group-centered, while in the autocratic situation it is leader-centered.

Naval leadership involves many different situations and consequently it requires varying degrees of autocratic and democratic leadership.

Individual differences are found among leaders to approximately the same extent that they exist in followers. The leader in a group is usually above the average in one or more important particulars. There are many ideal traits that people look for in their leaders and these can be acquired to some extent by all persons. All leaders do not possess all of these desirable traits.

Leadership in the Navy involves skill in organizing, skill in instructing and in the communication of ideas, and skill in planning and directing. The naval officer is required to have an extensive knowledge of professional subjects. In addition, he is expected to know much about the men with whom he serves.

A junior officer can greatly develop his capacity for leadership by listening to his men in order to know each of them as an individual. The rules which have been devised for extensive interviewing programs in industry are useful to a leader in getting acquainted with his subordinates.

CHAPTER IV

MOTIVATION

Motivation is concerned with the whys of human behavior. When we attempt to discover why men enlist in the Navy, why they expose themselves to danger, or why they go A. W. O. L., we are seeking to learn the motives which bring about these different behaviors. The naval officer, in the role of a leader, is required to exercise control over the actions of other men--to produce results through their coordinated efforts. To be effective in this role, he needs to understand the motives of men. For, if he can control their motives, he can control the behavior which they will express.

Motivation is an aspect of leadership which is intimately related to the morale, interests and attitudes of the individual members of the group. Like leadership, motivation is concerned with human behavior, about which much remains to be learned. However, motivation is somewhat more adaptable to scientific research and, as a result of this circumstance, a few general principles of motivation have been developed which may be accepted with a reasonable degree of confidence.

Literally, to motivate is to move--to actuate, and a

motive is anything that actuates. In the psychological sense, motivation is concerned with the inner forces which cause or influence human behavior, which in turn satisfies a need or desire. These needs, when they are considered as actuating forces are called drives. Thus the hunger drive is that which compels activity toward food seeking and eating. The thirst drive and the sex drive are other forces which result in observable behavior toward their satisfaction.

A motivating situation has both a subjective side and an objective side. The objective, or goal may be considered as that which provides satisfaction or gratification of the subjective need or desire. The intensity of activity toward goal seeking will vary from time to time and from one individual to another in accordance with the strength of the drive. During the recent war men who were adrift in rubber life rafts for weeks showed remarkable ingenuity and persistence in their efforts to collect water to drink.

In addition to the universal physiological drives, human behavior is caused by a number of social motives, some of which may be innate although many of them seem to be acquired as a result of the environment. The list of social motives is indefinite, but it includes such things as gregariousness, acquisitiveness, self-assertion, and pugnacity. Although these motives cannot be observed directly, their existence can be inferred through the expressions of human behavior to which they are ascribed.

Much of the research that has been accomplished in the field of motivation has been done in the area of educational psychology. It has been found that real learning does not take place without motivation, and the problem of motivating the learner has been the subject of hundreds of studies. One of the most evident results of these investigations has been the decrease in the use of corporal punishment as a part of the teaching process.

In recent years, and particularly in England and the United States, considerable attention has been focused on the subject of motivation in the industrial situation. With the growth of the labor movement, many employers for the first time became aware of the fact that men do not work for pay alone. Industrial psychologists were originally retained to aid in the selection of more productive workers from the applicants for employment. When they examined this problem thoroughly they found that actual worker productivity often shows little relationship to ability. Factors of far greater importance, they found, were the workers' interest in what they were doing and their attitudes towards their associates and particularly toward their supervisors. The subject of worker motivation presented an entirely new field for investigation and one in which many questions still remain to be answered.

The junior officer in the Navy is required to be a leader in both the teaching situation and in the work situ-

ation. In both of these roles, the extent of his accomplishment will be largely determined by the motivation which exists or can be provided. If he is to avoid expending his energies fruitlessly, he will need to have some understanding of the importance of motivation and of the motives which affect the behavior of his men.

In a survey recently conducted among Navy recruits, the subjects were asked to name the three most important reasons why they had decided to enlist. The responses included twenty-five different motives, those most frequently mentioned being: "Trade Training" (39.6%); "Travel-Adventure" (35.2%); "To Get Away" (20.7%); "Pay-Security" (15.3%).¹ Surveys of this type are useful to an officer in providing him with information on the motives of his men. With such material as a basis, he can also structure his interviews with them so as to improve his knowledge of their motives.

An understanding of what men are interested in can be of valuable assistance in directing their training and their work. For example, nearly every Navy job has its counterpart in civilian life. In the case of men who have joined the Navy to learn a trade, this fact can be used to increase their interest in learning their Navy jobs.

It is interesting to note that both in industry and in the Navy, pay is mentioned by comparatively few men as

¹Recruit Survey #1, Bureau of Naval Personnel Research Activity, Field Research Section, June 1947 (mimeographed).

the most important objective which they seek in their work. Many industrial surveys have found that high pay ranks in sixth place or lower. An analysis of many worker-management disputes will often indicate that the basis of dissatisfaction lies elsewhere than in the much publicized demands for higher pay.

Among psychologists there is almost universal agreement that when the basic physiological needs, such as hunger, thirst, and sex have been satisfied, the most important motivating factors in all individuals are the desire for recognition and the desire for security.

The Desire for Recognition

The desire for recognition appears in various forms. Every man who has a job wants to feel that the work he is doing is important and that its importance is recognized by his superiors. The coxswain of the motor launch and the captain of the ship are both motivated to do a better job when they feel that they are receiving the recognition they deserve.

Praise is a frequently used method of recognition. The intelligent leader will use praise as a means of motivation but he will also take care not to over-use it. When praise is used so often that it is almost a matter of routine it soon loses its effectiveness as a stimulant. No exceptional performance should be overlooked, but to praise every routine task that has been performed in a satisfactory man-

ner will lessen the effect of praise as a means of motivation.

Motivation through recognition does not necessarily require that the individuals be singled out as outstanding for any particular reason. Merely showing an interest in people as individuals rather than treating them as automata often produces motivation to a remarkable degree. This was convincingly demonstrated in the Hawthorne experiments,² which have become a classic in the study of human relations in industry.

An early phase of this experiment started out as an attempt to determine the effects of illumination on worker production. Two groups of workers of approximately equal ability and productivity were selected for this study; one group worked under varying conditions of illumination, and the other, the control group, worked under unchanged conditions. During the course of this experiment, the observers gathered some detailed information on the workers and displayed considerable interest in each of them as individuals. Throughout the course of the experiment it was found that the rate of production of both groups steadily increased over what they had ever previously attained. This, despite the fact that no physical change whatsoever had been made in the working conditions of the control group. The conclusion reached was that as a result of the interest that had been

²L. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, Management and the Worker (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939).

shown in the workers as individuals, their attitudes towards their work had improved to the extent that they were motivated toward greater productivity.

A fairly simple, yet often neglected method by which a superior can provide recognition for the members of his group is to address them by their names. No man likes being summoned by a "Hey you!" The newest member of the group enjoys a particularly satisfying feeling of progress when his superiors and his associates have learned his name.

A few good staff officers exert their best efforts behind a cloak of anonymity, but most men will do better when their names are identified with their accomplishments. Favorable mention of an individual's work in a ship's paper or other publication may help to increase his interest in his work. A man's name, when used in such a manner as to reflect credit upon him, is a useful aid to motivation.

Individuals seek recognition also as members of successful or honored groups. Being identified with such units serves to provide a feeling of togetherness which is an essential element for the establishment of a condition of high morale. The work that men do as a group frequently seems more pleasant and satisfying than that which is done individually. The recognition which results from being an accepted member of a distinguished group helps foster greater co-operation among individuals and provides motivation for the accomplishment of common goals.

Within the naval service, we have seen an example of outstanding achievement through group recognition and group motivation in the work of the newly formed Sea Bee units in World War II. The difficulty which confronts large industrial organizations in developing a feeling of togetherness is described in the following paragraph:

One of the great disadvantages of modern productive techniques is that they force many workers to do their work in psychological isolation and make for a clear distinction between work and play. The old-time craftsman played and conversed as he worked, but the modern man at the machine has little time to engage in friendly intercourse the man working next to him. The imperative need for leisure time and leisure-time activities in the modern world is a direct consequence of the fact that modern industrial methods take much of the fun out of work. The commercialization of recreation which has come about in recent years can be traced to this fact and to the disappearance of the other congenial situations that formed so much and such a satisfying part of the life of the individual in the older order.³

It is a humiliating and devastating experience for a man to be told to "keep his mind on his job," or that he is expected to work and not to think. Yet, some otherwise capable supervisors, either through their actions or their attitudes, are guilty of attempting to suppress the thinking of their subordinates. Men will think regardless of how they are treated, and desirable outlets for their thinking should be provided. When men are denied all the information they want about what they are doing they will fall into the habit of thinking about their real or imagined grievances.

³Richard T. LaPiere and Paul R. Farnsworth, Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1942), p. 317.

The most effective utilization of personnel requires that recognition be given to the desire of men to participate in the task of planning and thinking in matters that affect them. Men who feel free to offer suggestions and who know that their good ideas will be used, are motivated to think constructively. The sense of participation which they gain through their thinking will tend to increase their interest in their work and may promote valuable contributions toward the objectives of the organization.

During recent years industrial organizations have adopted a wide variety of suggestion systems. While all of these programs have not been equally successful, some of them have produced amazing results. A picture of the financial savings made possible through the use of a suggestion system is contained in the following report:

The use of suggestion boxes saved four plants under the same management \$5,697,748 in four years. During 1941, 133 suggestions were received and three adopted. During 1942, 1,490 suggestions were received and 123 adopted. During 1943, 4,789 suggestions were received and 962 adopted. During 1944 alone, \$2,724,574 was saved. During phase one, lip service was paid to the method. No publicity, no worker recognition, no written communications with the workers were employed. During phase two both publicity and patriotic appeal were used. During phase three, financial payments, recognition of workers and supervisors, and prompt answering of mail were practiced.⁴

From the above it can be seen that the manner of handling suggestions has a direct effect upon the number of

⁴Maurice D. Woolf, "The Expanding Use of Personnel Methods," Journal of Social Psychology, 27 February, 1948, p. 133.

The first of these is the fact that the
 majority of the cases of the disease are
 found in the autumn and winter months.
 This fact is of great importance in the
 study of the disease, and it is of great
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 The second of these is the fact that the
 disease is found in the autumn and winter
 months. This fact is of great importance
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The third of these is the fact that the
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The seventh of these is the fact that the
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The eighth of these is the fact that the
 disease is found in the autumn and winter
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 great importance in the study of the disease.

suggestions received. The explanation for the failure of many suggestion programs often lies in the negligent manner in which suggestions are handled by management.

As yet, no wide-scale suggestion system has been placed in operation in a naval or military organization. However, it is neither essential nor always desirable that suggestions be handled through a formal system. The officer who is willing to listen to the suggestions of his men, to expand upon them if necessary, and to use them--and let it be known where they came from, will go far toward providing his organization with a suggestion system that will be completely adequate.

Full participation in the activities of an organization includes participation in the thinking as well as in the work. The leader must provide his men with information and he must be receptive to their ideas and suggestions. The channels of communication need to be kept open in both directions. If men are expected to work co-operatively and well, it is important that recognition be given to their right to think.

The Desire for Security

The desire for security is closely related to the basic physiological needs, the need for food and shelter, both for the present and for the future. Security in one's job or profession generally provides assurance of continued income, which in turn provides for the basic needs of the

worker and his family. Even though the loss of his job may not result in actual hunger, it often means that he is unable to obtain many things which he considers to be essentials.

Surveys among workers in industry show that employees often rank security of employment at the top of the list of factors which they hold to be important in their jobs.⁵ Economic and personal security are nearly always important determinants in the choice of an occupation or place of employment.

The Navy offers greater security of employment than is usually found in industry. The officer or enlisted man in the Navy is freed from the uncertainties of employment which are caused by the instability of business conditions, and he is assured of a career, which on a long term basis, provides greater economic security than he ordinarily finds in any type of civilian employment. For example, the typical enlisted man who serves twenty years in the Navy can, at present, transfer to the Fleet Reserve with an assured income of \$107.25 per month. Such an income if purchased on an annuity basis, would cost about thirty-two thousand dollars.⁶

Security, however, is not entirely a matter of economic conditions. The officer who assumes that there is

⁵ Edwin E. Chiselli and Clarence W. Brown, Personnel and Industrial Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1948), pp. 438-441.

⁶ Bureau of Naval Personnel, Facts and Figures of Naval Service, October, 1945. p. 5.

nothing further he can do to add to the security of his men after he has explained to them the financial advantages of a naval career is making a serious error.

McGregor considers that the outstanding characteristic of the relationship between the subordinate and his superiors is his dependence upon them for the satisfaction of his needs, and especially of the need for security. He adds:

Psychologically the dependence of the subordinate upon his superiors is a fact of extraordinary significance, in part because of its emotional similarity to the dependence characteristic of another earlier relationship: that between the child and his parents. The similarity is more than an analogy. The adult subordinate's dependence upon his superiors actually awakens certain emotions and attitudes which were part of his childhood relationship with his parents, and which apparently have long since been outgrown. The adult is usually unaware of the similarity because most of this complex of childhood emotions has been repressed. Although the emotions influence his behavior, they are not accessible to consciousness under ordinary circumstances.⁷

The labor-management contracts which have been negotiated in recent years demonstrate the extent to which employees seek to protect themselves against real or imagined threats to their security. The actions of immediate superiors are often regarded as the source of these threats. Subordinates, perhaps unknowingly recognizing their dependence upon superiors, will struggle to provide themselves

⁷Douglas McGregor, "Conditions of Effective Leadership in the Industrial Organization" in Theodore M. Newcomb, Eugene L. Hartley and others, eds., Readings in Social Psychology, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947), p. 428.

with adequate measures of individual security.

The underlying aspects of the dependence of the subordinate upon his superiors are common at all levels. The desire for security which is found in the industrial situation is no less prevalent in the Navy. The subordinate in industry is dependent upon his superiors for his job, for promotion, for pay, responsibility and prestige. In addition to these things, the subordinate in the Navy is dependent upon his superiors for much of his leisure time opportunities, for his shore leave and liberty, and for other personal and social satisfactions which are beyond the control of the supervisor in industry.

The first major requirement for satisfaction of the desire for security in the subordinate's relation with his superior is that of an atmosphere of approval. This atmosphere originates in the underlying attitudes of the superior--in the manner in which he conducts all of his relationships with his subordinates. The individual who functions in an atmosphere of approval does not hold back his efforts in the fear that he may unintentionally arouse the displeasure of his superior.

In the Navy, it has long been held that "Loyalty down begets loyalty up."⁸ True loyalty implies confidence and a

⁸The United States Naval Institute, Naval Leadership, With Some Hints to Junior Officers and Others (Annapolis: The United States Naval Institute, 1939), p. 11.

sense of security. Subordinates will have a feeling of security only when they know that they have the genuine approval of their superiors. This must be complete approval of all that they do. Until such time as this condition prevails, the subordinates will exist in an atmosphere of uncertainty and will regard the actions of their superiors with suspicion, as a threat to their security.

Another requirement for the security of the subordinate is a thorough knowledge of what is expected of him. With an understanding of this, he is better able to function with confidence and to obtain satisfaction of his own needs.

The foundation of this knowledge is based on an understanding of the policies of the organization of which he is a part. These policies should be clearly stated and should be made known to all who are affected by them. In addition to knowing the basic policies, the subordinate needs to know the specific rules and regulations which are applicable to his own particular position in the organization. In the absence of an understanding of these things, there will be continuing uncertainty due to the possibility of unintentional missteps.

The security of the subordinate requires that he have a definite knowledge of his place in the organization, his duties, responsibilities, and the limitations on his authority. The lack of this knowledge, especially on the part of the lower level supervisors, is responsible for much in-

decision and confusion.

One of the most important needs of an individual in a subordinate position is to know how he is regarded in the eyes of his superior. To some degree this need is provided for by periodic ratings of subordinates. Too often, these ratings may lead to a false sense of security, and some business concerns have recognized this danger by requiring that every supervisor conduct private discussions with each of his subordinates for the purpose of providing them with a better understanding of how they are doing. A knowledge of the personal peculiarities of the subordinate's immediate superior also helps toward improving his sense of security.

In the Navy, one of the most common obstacles in the way of a sense of continuing security is the frequent lack of advance knowledge of changes which affect the individual. Necessary ship movements and unexpected transfer orders serve to disrupt the life of Navy men in a manner that is not in harmony with the desire for security. Resistance to change is a common phenomenon among men in all walks of life. This resistance cannot be completely overcome, but it can be greatly reduced if adequate advance information is given on the changes that are going to take place. The Navy policy with regard to rotation of duty between sea and shore helps provide some advance information of changes that may be expected. Officers who have the responsibility for the transfer of personnel should be constantly aware of the desira-

bility of adhering to the established policies and avoiding sudden upsets for changes insofar as is possible.

In the relationship of the subordinate with his superior, a third major requirement for security is that of consistent discipline. When the known rules are disregarded on one occasion and strictly observed on another, a feeling of uncertainty and insecurity is engendered. A similar undesirable condition results when the subordinate fails to receive the unqualified support of his superior for actions that are in line with the objectives of the organization. Security is developed through confidence in knowing what to expect from above. On the need for consistent discipline, McGregor states:

. . . . the subordinate must know that failure to live up to his responsibilities, or to observe the rules which are established will result in punishment. Every individual has many wants which conflict with the demands of his job. If he knows that breaking the rules to satisfy these wants will almost inevitably result in the frustration of his vital long-range needs, self-discipline will be less difficult. If, on the other hand, discipline is inconsistent and uncertain, he may be unnecessarily denying himself satisfaction by obeying rules. The insecurity born of uncertainty and of guilt, which is inevitably a consequence of lax discipline, is unpleasant and painful for the subordinate.

What frequently happens is this. The superior, in trying to be a "good fellow," fails to maintain discipline and to obtain the standards of performance which are necessary. His subordinates--human beings striving to satisfy their needs--"take advantage of the situation." The superior then begins to disapprove of his subordinates (in spite of the fact that he is to blame for their behavior). Perhaps he "cracks down" on them, perhaps he simply grows more and more critical and disapproving. In either event, because he has failed to establish consistent discipline in an atmosphere of genuine approval, they are threatened. The combination of guilt and insecurity

rity on the part of the subordinates leads easily to antagonism, and therefore to further actions of which the superior disapproves. Thus a vicious circle of disapproval → antagonistic acts → more disapproval → more antagonistic acts is set up. In the end it becomes extremely difficult to remedy a situation of this kind because both superior and subordinate have a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude which must be abolished before the relationship can improve.⁹

The Desire for Status

The position that an individual occupies in an organization is of considerable importance to him and he is particularly concerned that he not be placed in a position inferior to that which he actually occupies. In industry, a sharp distinction is often made between office workers and shop workers. An office worker who is transferred to a shop position may be greatly disturbed over his loss of status even though his pay remains unchanged.

Status may be conferred or attained in various ways such as by seniority or by means of symbols. In the Navy, status is often indicated by the cleaning station to which the man is assigned or by the size or location of the locker in which he keeps his possessions.

In one large organization desks were an important symbol: the lowest clerical workers worked at tables, the next level had single-pedestal desks with one bank of drawers, the supervisors had double pedestal desks with two banks of drawers, and so on, up to the plant manager who had a great big desk of fancy woods.¹⁰

⁹McGregor, op. cit., p. 432.

¹⁰Laurie B. Gardner, Human Relations in Industry (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1946), p. 19.

A simple and practical way to obtain motivation through the employment of status is to assign a title to as many positions as is possible. One title which is familiar throughout the Navy is that of "Oil King." The man who looks after the distribution of fuel in the various tanks in a ship may be a Chief Petty Officer, or, on small ships, he may be a Fireman. But he is probably motivated toward a better interest in his work by reason of the title that goes with his duties.

Status in an organization helps provide satisfaction for the desire for security as well as the desire for recognition, and anything that endangers one's status is regarded as a threat to his security. The alert leader will not overlook the importance of status in his dealings with his subordinates.

The Desire for Advancement

The desire for advancement originates out of one's level of aspiration, which is defined by Maier in the following statement: "What constitutes success and failure is a relative matter, and the psychological process that determines whether a particular action gives the satisfaction of success or the frustration of failure is one's level of aspiration."¹¹

It has been observed that a person's level of aspi-

¹¹Norman K. F. Maier, Psychology in Industry (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946), p. 244.

I think the evidence is very strong.

There is no evidence of any kind in the case.

The evidence is in the case, and it is very strong.

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ration will vary from time to time in accordance with the success or failure that is experienced in attaining his goals. From this it may be inferred that success and failure are forms of reward and punishment which satisfy or deny the needs of the ego.

The ambitious man has a lot of self-motivation. And even where the level of aspiration remains fairly close to actual performance, there is a general tendency for it to remain above rather than below actual performance. The channels of advancement should be kept open to as many men as possible. Promotion policies that are carefully formulated and fairly administered can do much to maintain an optimum of motivation through desire for advancement.

It is generally found that younger men want opportunities while older men tend to prefer security. When Navy recruits were asked to name the reasons that would make them want to re-enlist, "Satisfactory Promotion" was the factor most frequently mentioned.¹² Yet, during the personnel expansion that accompanied World War II it was not unusual to find Chief Petty Officers with fifteen or twenty years service who had declined to be considered for advancement to commissioned rank. These men usually stated that they felt that the additional responsibilities would be more than they could handle.

¹²Recruit Survey #1, op. cit., p. 5.

Frustration

Up to this point we have been dealing with the positive aspects of motivation, the satisfaction of human needs and how favorable attitudes and interests can be developed through the satisfaction of these needs. The naval officer should also be aware of some of the effects of negative motivation, the behavior that results from the denial of satisfaction, or, frustration.

Men who are disturbed by frustrating situations provide many of our disciplinary cases--the malingerers, the overly anxious and the discontented. Some of these men have developed interests that are in conflict with their work in the Navy; others may have never succeeded in making the adjustment from civilian life, while still others are disturbed by some real or imagined injustice in the treatment they have received. Laziness is nearly always symptomatic of a lack of motivation.

Every month, thousands of young men enter the Navy as recruits. At the present time, every recruit has voluntarily enlisted. Presumably, they have given considerable thought to this step, and most of them have had an opportunity to talk with someone who has served in the Navy--other than the recruiters. Nevertheless, some of these men will find it difficult to adjust themselves to the pattern of behavior which the Navy requires of them. The deprivation of many of their former opportunities for impulse gratification

Appendix

The first part of the appendix contains a list of the names of the persons who have been named in the various reports of the Commission on the activities of the various groups and individuals mentioned in the report. The second part of the appendix contains a list of the names of the persons who have been named in the various reports of the Commission on the activities of the various groups and individuals mentioned in the report. The third part of the appendix contains a list of the names of the persons who have been named in the various reports of the Commission on the activities of the various groups and individuals mentioned in the report.

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may reactivate early childhood attitudes of resentment.

Those individuals who, when they are confronted with difficulties with which they cannot effectively cope, give up and revert to the inadequate reactions of an earlier childhood period, are said to be employing regressive behavior. This may take the form of weeping, stamping the feet, cursing, or other actions which are typical of immaturity.

A more frequently encountered reaction to frustration is aggressive behavior, which in the broad meaning of the term, includes such actions as striking, threatening, and fighting as well as such less observable responses as hatred, irritation, and resentment. The aggressive behavior may be directed toward the person or object which is perceived to be the cause of the frustration; it may be directed at an innocent person or object--a scapegoat; it may be directed at one's self. The ultimate in aggressive action toward one's self is, of course, suicide.

In the Navy, as well as in many other situations, the frustrating agent often cannot be directly attacked and perhaps, not even identified. In such instances the aggressive action may then be directed against a shipmate, possibly a convenient subordinate.

When it is definitely known that punishment will follow a direct aggressive action, this action may be inhibited and replaced by an indirect act of aggression. Thus,

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a man who has been denied a very much wanted leave may be frustrated to the extent that he wants to attack his superior. But, because he knows that severe punishment is certain to result from such action, he may instead proceed to violate several minor regulations or intentionally perform his duties in a negligent manner.

Aggressive behavior is not always to be condemned. There are times when it is highly desirable as, for example, in a combat situation where the enemy is the frustrating agent.

Another common adjustment to frustration is termed rationalization. This is the ascribing of plausible but false motives to one's behavior. It is a form of ego protection which is indulged in by all persons at times. The danger in rationalization is that it tends to become a habit. The man who fails to win a promotion may be frustrated but he may attempt to rationalize the situation to himself and to others by insisting that promotions are made on the basis of favoritism rather than by merit. As a result of such rationalization he may be less favorably motivated to try for a promotion in the future.

Compensation as a method of adjustment to frustration is often characterized by an intense struggle to overcome some deficiency. By conscientious exercise and vigorous living, a sickly child may overcome his early start and become physically strong. This is direct compensation of the

type which has been attributed to Theodore Roosevelt. Compensation may also appear in the form of some contrasting quality, such as excessive boasting in the absence of real ability.

Two other forms of adjustment to frustration are repression and projection. These are probably less common in the Navy than some of the other adjustments but they may be extremely difficult to deal with if permitted to exist over a long period of time. Repression is the conscious effort to deny the existence of a frustrated need. A man may reach the state where he has succeeded in apparently forgetting that the need exists, yet he may experience a continuous disturbance caused by an unconscious desire for satisfaction of the need.

Projection is the mechanism of adjustment whereby the individual projects his own suppressed wishes into others. A reformed drunkard who has become a prohibitionist may see his suppressed desire for alcohol in people who are actually quite temperate.

An officer cannot always prevent or avoid situations which will cause frustration in his men. He can, however, through tolerance and understanding, help make the frustrating situation less painful. By recognizing the conditions which bring about frustration and by providing substitute goals where possible, he can often assist his men in making satisfactory adjustments and thus enable them to avoid serious difficulties.

Summary

The behavior of individuals is determined to a large extent by the necessity for satisfying certain needs or drives. All people have in common a number of basic physical needs which result in observable behavior for their satisfaction. In addition, there are also many acquired social needs which serve to compel or modify human behavior. Any person who can manipulate the motives of others thereby influences their behavior. Thus, a naval officer who can present his requirements in such a manner as to make the accomplishment of the required tasks coincide with the satisfaction of his men's needs, is exercising leadership through motivation. Without motivation the willing and co-operative efforts of individuals cannot be obtained.

The two major needs or drives which influence the behavior of men in the Navy are the desire for recognition and the desire for security. Satisfaction of the desire for recognition is provided by the use of praise, by taking an interest in men as individuals, and by recognizing their right to participate in the task of thinking.

The desire for security includes economic security for the satisfaction of the physical needs, security of status, and security in one's relations with his associates, and especially with his superiors. The security of a subordinate in his relations with his superiors requires that he exist in an atmosphere of approval, that he have a defi-

nite knowledge of what is expected of him, and of what he may expect from his superiors. Security as a motivating factor is of greater importance to older men than to younger men.

The desire for status and the desire for advancement are other factors which influence the behavior of men in the Navy. It is generally found that young men are much interested in opportunities for advancement.

Little is accomplished in the absence of motivation. And, when men have strong desires which are in conflict with their Navy duties, an officer may experience difficulty in obtaining the co-operative efforts which his leadership is expected to produce.

The naval officer, in order to exercise control over the behavior of others, needs to have an intelligent understanding of the relationship between motivation and behavior. He needs also to have a knowledge of the effects of frustration on behavior--of the disturbances which are caused by a lack of satisfaction of an individual's needs or desires.

CHAPTER V

PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

In the two previous chapters we have been considering some of the principles of leadership and motivation which are of importance to the junior officer in the Navy. Next, some practical applications of these principles will be suggested. Most of these techniques are in common use by successful officers, but a few of them have been developed as a result of studies of human relations in other fields and have not as yet been widely used in the Navy. First to be considered will be those things which the leader can do for himself, and second, those things which he can do for others to improve his leadership.

Self-Improvement

The personality of the leader plays an important part in the manner in which he exercises his leadership, but, in the case of the average officer, it is not advisable to attempt to develop any particular type of personality. The personality which is natural to the individual is generally best for his leadership. The leader who pretends to be what he is not exposes himself to the danger of ridicule, which can be fatal to his success.

Because there is no perfect mold for leadership, there is no point in trying to shape one's personality to match that of any successful leader, regardless of the admiration that one may have for him. It is, of course, often profitable to study the methods of successful men, but the situations in which these methods were employed must be clearly understood. As an essential element of each situation, one should consider the personality of the leader. A method which produced good results for one individual could conceivably produce failure when copied by a leader with a different type of personality.

The first suggestion, then, for the aspiring leader is that he analyze his own personality for the purpose of determining which forms of behavior are best for his leadership.

The practical exercise of leadership is concerned largely with the function of problem solving. Every situation is in some respects unique and requires its own solution in the light of the facts. The scientific method of problem-solving is best described by listing the five steps involved in the process; these are:¹

1. The statement of the problem. From this we should obtain a clear conception of the goal to be attained.
2. The gathering together of all the pertinent facts in

¹Manual for Practical Development of Leadership Qualities (Washington: Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1944), pp. 9-10.

the case. In leadership problems, this includes all available data about the environment of the men, the situation, and about the leader himself. Care needs to be taken to differentiate clearly between facts and opinion.

3. The analysis of the problem in the light of all the facts. This step calls into operation the knowledge of the leader, his judgment and his reasoning power. This provides him with a complete picture of the entire situation.
4. The formulation of a tentative conclusion--a plan of action and a method of carrying it out. This generally involves the consideration of, and the choice between, two or more alternate plans.
5. The examination of the tentatively selected course of action or conclusion to determine whether or not it is consistent with the facts, the experience of the leader, and with the experiences of others.

A second suggestion for the self-improvement of the aspiring leader is that he consider every act of leadership as a problem in itself and learn to use the problem-solving method instinctively.

The habitual behavior of the leader will have a tremendous effect on his success in influencing the behavior of his followers. He should always be aware of the fact that his own actions set the standards for those of his group. If he hopes to maintain proper discipline among his subordinates he must conform to the rules of the organization himself. The loyalty and enthusiasm of the individual members of the group are but a reflection of that of their leader and theirs can never be expected to exceed his.

There are, of course, many habits which are so obviously bad for leadership that they scarcely require con-

sideration here. Neatness in personal appearance, as well as in all other respects, is of particular importance in the Navy. All officers are expected to be circumspect in their manner of speaking, to shun the use of uncalled for profanity and sarcasm, and to employ a calm and confident tone of voice.

Every person who has developed to maturity in the normal environment of the American family, schools, and other social institutions, has a reasonable knowledge of which personal habits are considered as being "bad." In general, he may assume that those habits which are frowned upon by our culture will detract from one's leadership ability.

A third suggestion for the self-improvement of the leader is that he make periodic self-appraisals for the purpose of detecting and correcting those mannerisms which tend to weaken him in the eyes of his associates.

Techniques in Acts of Leadership

Every act of leadership should make the follower feel that as long as he is doing his best to follow, he will be secure and his efforts will receive recognition. There are a great number of techniques that the leader may use to encourage these feelings.²

One of the first opportunities that an officer has to employ the above principle occurs when he relieves his predecessor in the presence of his newly acquired subordi-

²Ibid., p. 35.

nates. All of us have experienced the feeling of uncertainty which is involved in a change in administration--of the speculation that accompanies the arrival of a "new boss." Naval custom in this situation usually provides an officer with an opportunity to meet his new subordinates under favorable conditions and to enlist their co-operation by relieving their feelings of apprehension.

An extreme example of how not to approach a new position of authority is illustrated by the intentions of an officer who was enroute to take command of a small outlying post. This prospective commanding officer stated to the writer that although he had no knowledge of the conditions which existed on the post, he had already decided that immediately upon assuming command, he would direct that all green fences be repainted red, and that all red fences be changed to green. This, he said, would insure that all hands knew that "the new boss had taken over."

A leader who is conscious of the needs of his new subordinates can obtain their co-operation by assuring them that there will be no radical change in policy and that whatever changes are made will be the result of careful deliberation and consultation with those concerned. Regardless of whether he is taking over a good or a poor organization, he should educate the personnel as to the need for changes before they are made. In no case should he express or encourage criticisms of the previous administration.

The morale of the organization is boosted when the new leader informs the personnel that he has been advised that all are doing a good job and that they will be retained in their present positions. When he has had time to analyze the situation, he can gradually replace those whom he considers to be incompetent.

It is particularly dangerous for a new leader to attempt to cover up his ignorance by bluffing. When an officer is new in an organization he should frequently call on his subordinates for advice on matters with which he is not thoroughly familiar. By welcoming their suggestions and recommendations, he not only improves his own knowledge of the situation, but also improves the motivation of the group by giving them a sense of participation.

A junior officer should lose no time in learning as much about his men as he can. An excellent procedure for doing this is to arrange to have an informal interview with each man. When this has been accomplished he may find it advisable to establish a system whereby he interviews every man who joins or leaves the organization.

A friendly interview can help satisfy the men's desire for security and recognition and at the same time provide the leader with much useful information. Although friendly and informal, the interview should be carefully planned and intelligently controlled.

The interviewing officer must insure that suitable

arrangements are made for the time and place of the interview, and for his own guidance he should outline the items of information he needs to obtain. Until such time as he has become adept at interviewing, he should keep his check list inconspicuously at hand.

The time selected for the interviews should be such as will not interfere with the men's personal activities. About twenty to thirty minutes should be allowed for each initial interview. When a large number of men must be seen in a brief period of time, a shorter interview is probably better than none at all. However, the officer who thinks he can find out all he needs to know about a man in five or ten minutes is usually deceiving himself.

Careful consideration needs be given to the selection of the place for the interviews. An office or desk space where freedom from interference is assured should be made available. As a general rule, junior officers should not undertake to interview men in the officer's mess room or bunk room and neither should the crew's living spaces be used for this purpose when other arrangements can be made.

The interviewer must keep in mind that he should do considerably less than fifty per cent of the talking. The objective is to get, rather than to give information. In many instances, a fair amount of skill will be required to get the interviewee to talk freely. A generally successful way to start a man talking about himself is to inquire about

his previous experience. This is a subject on which each individual can talk with the confidence and authority of an expert, and it will often bring out information that is useful in determining if he has been properly placed in the organization, what type of training he requires, and what he aspires to do.

When a man is found to be having difficulties or is in need of counseling, a tentative course of action should be set up and definite arrangements made for a subsequent interview with him. In the interview, as in all acts of leadership, the officer needs to be careful not to make promises which he knows he cannot fulfill.

The interest, enthusiasm, and co-operation of men in positions of minor responsibility can be strengthened through the use of group discussions or conferences. Many officers are known to consider conferences as a waste of time and quite often they are correct. Desultory conferences in any organization usually result from a lack of planning and/or a lack of leadership. A conference which is leaderless is often pointless.

The group discussion method is particularly useful for training petty officers in the development of leadership qualities. In addition, it increases the sense of participation of those present and thus serves to provide motivation for improved performance. Individual thinking is stimulated, new ideas and suggestions are encouraged, and mutual under-

standing and agreement are enhanced.

A detailed description of how to conduct a conference will not be attempted here. But, it is recommended that every officer will do well to master the technique of conference leadership early in his career. The rules are few and simple, and the principles are similar to those for other acts of leadership.

The range of subjects which might be discussed in conferences led by junior officers is sufficiently wide to permit a great number of interesting and useful discussions. Such questions as "How do you distinguish between a good petty officer and a poor one?", or "What can we do to reduce the waste of supplies in this division?" might profitably be discussed. No attempt should be made to reach decisions in matters on which the group is without authority to act.

The number of participants in a conference should be small. Six to eight petty officers in addition to the leader is about right. In general, the leader should state the problem briefly and clearly, then keep the discussion moving by the use of follow-up questions. At the end of the conference he should summarize what seems to have been agreed upon by the majority of the group.

One writer on the subject lists the duties and qualifications of a good discussion leader as follows:

1. In opening, he will emphasize that everyone is to take part.
2. He must know techniques of procedure to be followed.

3. He should be able to create interest in the subject of the discussion.

4. He should keep the informal discussion atmosphere by having all members, including himself, remain seated when talking.

5. He should have a deep and abiding faith in people--a conviction that the collective wisdom and good judgment of the members are almost always better than the wisdom and judgment of any single person in the group.

6. He should start and close on time.³

Particular attention should be given to Number 5 on the above list. The conference leader may contribute to the discussion but he should not make the mistake of looking upon the participants as an audience and proceed to deliver a lecture.

Conclusion

Every new development in naval warfare or in the material which it employs imposes an additional burden upon the junior officer. Each year the weapons and equipment with which he works become more complex, more costly, and more dangerous. The scientific knowledge that he could profitably use is often more than he can possibly acquire. It is almost inevitable that he will be given some tasks for which his technical knowledge and experience are inadequate. In these situations he will be dependent upon the knowledge and abilities of others--and upon his own leadership.

As his rank and responsibilities increase, he will become more and more dependent upon the performance of his

³J. D. MacConnell, "Talking Things Over," U. S. Navy Training Bulletin, June, 1948, p. 17.

subordinates for the successful discharge of his duties.

Regardless of the position that he attains or the progress that is made in the development of better equipment, he will find that in his profession, there is no limit to the application of the principles of leadership and motivation. By mastering these principles and the techniques for their application when he is a junior officer, he makes his immediate tasks less difficult and also prepares himself for advancement to positions of greater responsibility where he will be required to organize, plan, co-ordinate, and command the activities of large organizations.

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
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